Have you left Islam & suffered the consequences in Britain?

The British Pakistani Christian Association are making a public appeal for any ex-Muslims within Britain who have/are suffering persecution for abandoning the Islamic faith, for a study. The study also extends to those who have fled to the UK on religiously persecuted grounds, only to undergo re-persecution for his/her ex-Muslim status.

If this is applicable to your situation, click the following link for further details:

http://www.britishpakistanichristians.org/blog/have-you-left-islam-and-then-suffered-any-hate-crime-or-persecution-we-want-to-hear-from-you-for-a-s

Additionally the BPCA have released an online survey, which examines the experience of the ex-Muslim, whether you are convert to another faith, or atheism/agnosticism. The survey can be found below and will significantly help us in our work to highlight this topical issue in the UK.

https://www.surveymonkey.co.uk/r/MBFNKYK

Anyone wishing to participate in the study should leave their contact in the relevant section of the survey, or alternatively contact the BPCA (details of which are found on the above link) or my e-mail address.

We look forward to hearing from you.

 

Thesis Conclusion

Taking the findings of the dissertation into consideration, it is clear to see that the concept of freedom of religion, as espoused in the UNDR (1947), ECHR (1950) and ICCPR (1966) fundamentally exists in theory yet cannot be guaranteed in practice within a British context. This dissertation examined the relevance of religion in Europe in the 21st Century and upon recognising its salience to the modern, western world – as demonstrated through the rise of Islam, analysed the concept of the Muslim Cultural Defence; a reactionary affront to secularism in Europe and indeed Britain, as demonstrated in the general pattern of de-Christianisation throughout Europe. The fundamental Muslim resentment at the British, political, secularist reaction to the Salman Rushdie Affair polarised factions of Muslim communities, solidifying the Cultural Defence and regarding any heterodoxy within such communities as an attack on their Islamic way of life; of which apostasy is the worst offence. Through the case studies of British apostates and ex-Muslim, Christian converts, it is evident that freedom of religion exists but for a few, as if it truly existed in practice, the likes of Nissar Hussain would not feel compelled to set up safe havens for fellow apostates. Yet it is Nissar’s phrase ‘I may as well be living in Pakistan’ that annihilates the belief of freedom of religion, as the comparison of the United Kingdom to a country that continues to witness the killing of religious minorities, is indeed a dire blow to British values and promises of religious freedom.

 

Chapter VI: The Case of Nissar Hussain, broken for Christ.

You are shunned, treated as an apostate, a traitor. Your property is continually damaged. I have had physical assaults. You find yourself completely isolated, broken (Nissar Hussain in the Barnabas Fund 2016).

 

This chapter will examine the case of British Pakistani, Nissar Hussain, who emerged as Europe’s and Britain’s regional and national face for the ex-Muslim, Christian convert. The chapter highlights the persecution he and his family have endured from 2000 to present day, utilising excerpts from his daughter, Anniesa Hussain’s blog in which she documents her experiences as the child of an apostate; before examining the political police and legal failures in addressing the religious hate the family have endured, to conclude that there exists no freedom of religion for the apostate from Islam in spite of ratified Human Rights Legislation.

 

6.1 Leaving Islam, Embracing Christianity

Nissar Hussain has been the national face for Christian converts from Islam in Britain since 2001, when news circulating his apostasy throughout his local Muslim community in Bradford resulted in daily verbal and physical abuse that culminated in alerting local media, in order to address the innate suppression of ex-Muslims. Nissar officially converted to Christianity in 1996, where the trauma of his brother’s death left him soul-searching, leading him to find solace and truth in the example of Jesus Christ, where Islam had fundamentally failed. News of Nissar’s conversion soon spread, resulting in his disownment by immediate family and friends and his family endured daily harassment, initially in the form of daily emotional and verbal abuse; before resulting in damage to family property and physical assaults, forcing the family to flee to another part of Bradford in 2006. The family were approached by Channel 4’s Dispatches in 2007, interested in investigating the persecution ex-Muslim Christian converts and upon its release, resulted in a second wave of religious hate crimes, the most severe of which resulted in Nissar’s hospitalisation in November 2015.

 

6.2 Infidels Are Us

Anniesa, daughter of Nissar Hussain, set up the blog platform infidelsareus in 2014 in order to highlight the marginalisation of the ex-Muslim Christian convert. She recalls her childhood experience, growing up as the symbol of heterodoxy in the face of community orthodoxy. Anniesa has documented her life from life as a 6 year old (2000) up until the aftermath of her father’s attack on November 17, 2015.

 ‘Sustained Persecution of the Hussain Family 2000-2006’

From the time I was 6 years of age, my siblings and I endured daily verbal abuse, physical altercations, car and house window smashings. School playground hostility and school-mate deprivation. Death threats. Mob rule. Initial prevention of riding our bicycles in the neighbour common ground to then prevention of us playing on the street directly outside our property. I watched my father’s effort in erecting a 6ft fence in his backyard to protect his children become effectively decimated. I can’t ever imagine his pain, his helplessness when his fence still never stopped the glass bottles and bricks being hurled at his children as they played in their own back garden (infidelsareus 2015).

 

‘An Abnormal Normality’

I never understood, walking out of the house hand-in-hand with a sister or father, why our walls and windows were scrawled with the words ‘Fuck you!’ ‘Jew Dogs’ ‘Fucking Christians’ ‘Christian Dogs’ in ugly, black and permanent graffiti – marked out for the whole world to see. I didn’t see why so many Pakistani children at my school could look me straight in the face and tell me ‘we can’t play with you because my parents said you’re a Christian’. Nor was it acceptable to me, when they set fire to our neighbouring abandoned property, in order for the flames to lick across our house beams and set our house alight. At least when we had to flee to a local vicarage for safety, we were afforded a few weeks of peace and calamity. I could never accept the verbal and physical attacks on my parents and will never forget as a seven year old, an attempt on my Father’s life (infidelsareus, 2014).

 

‘Round II: 2008-2015’

In 2008 did the second round of persecution begin to unfold. I refer to it as the ‘second round’ since our current residence is the second family home in Bradford under which we’re enduring persecution. We were instantly shunned and faced immediate hostility from the Pakistani families on our street. There are approximately six Pakistani Muslim families on our street and upon seeing the documentary, became aware that we were not the Muslim family they’d assumed us to be – worse yet we used to be that Muslim family- and their contempt continues to this day (infidelsareus, 2015)

 

Bradford Attack: 17/11/2015’

Nissar Hussain is a living example of an ex-Muslim and it is this factor that doesn’t swallow well with Muslim families such as those who attempted to orchestrate his demise. His stance, his desire to fight his Muslim oppressors in a non-Muslim country has gained him enough hatred which culminated in an attempt on his life. If you watch the cctv footage you can see the pick-axe aimed for Dad’s head…

… It has come at a great cost but I think even Dad has finally accepted that one man is incapable of changing a system geared against apostates such as our family. So as we undergo a time of review and reflection as to where to move away from Bradford please continue to bear our family in prayer during the uncertain and uneasy transition. After almost two decades of sustained persecution, every single one of us has simply had enough. We want peace and stability, we want the ability to walk outside our property to a car that hasn’t been smashed, a father that doesn’t get brutally beaten. We need to be able to breathe and move freely (infidelsareus, 2015).

 

6.3 The political implications behind the persecution of the Hussain family

In his 2008 doctorate thesis, No Place to Call Home: Experiences of Apostates from Islam & Failures of the International Community , Meral (2008) situates the plight of the Hussain family within a political Cultural Defence framework:

Muslim diaspora communities tend to regard apostasy as a betrayal of their ongoing struggles with identity within their host countries. The more distant the culture of the host country is from an Islamic and Middle Eastern culture, the more intense the imperative becomes for maintaining Islam identity. When identities are precarious, their enforcement will take an aggressive form. This helps to understand why apostates face an equally dangerous situation, even when they are born and raised in a Western country (Meral 2008: 63).

The anti-Muslim discrimination organisation, Tell-Mama UK , re-quotes Meral in his allusion to this inherently political opposition to apostates from Islam, additionally also referring to the case of Nissar to deny any religious undertone to the persecution of his family, in stating:

A deliberate conflation overlooks the intricate dynamics of countries whose intolerance of apostasy is often political and not religious in nature… In 2001 (the year of the Bradford Riots), relations between the Asian communities and others were poor. So a conversion away from Islam was also viewed by some as a deep community betrayal. In that context, it might explain why the Hussain family suffered broken windows and street harassment (Tell-Mama, 2014).

Yet, whilst it is correct to highlight the political tensions and the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ paradigm as one result of racial/religious frustrations; it should also important to highlight the political correctness and fear of being labelled ‘racist’, or ‘Islamophobe’ provides the very grounds in which religious intolerance towards apostates from Islam and the very religious persecution directed towards the Hussain family is allowed to continue. It is also imperative to point out and include the overt failures of the Bradford police force and Bradford west local councillors and Members of Parliament (MP), as a political factor in the continuation of the persecution of the Hussain family.

Barnabas Fund published a letter written by Nissar to his local and current MP, Naz Shah, highlighting his precarious situation and the failures of the police, in addition to asking for her assistance in the matter:

Dear Naseem Shah MP,

Can I congratulate you on behalf of myself and family on your stunning victory and we can’t express our delight as our newly elected MP for the Ward of Manningham and wish you every success for the future. On a serious note can I express our utter misery and dire situation as Christian converts from a Mirpuri/Muslim background since 1996… when I had reported it to Police prior to this happening the Police sergeant’s response was: “Stop trying to be a crusader and move out!” In short the Police had wilfully failed us so as not to be labelled racists or seem to cause the Muslim community offence at our suffering and expense… I cannot express in words the Police failure over the years which has led to our suffering and have no confidence in them whatsoever and am desperate for your help (Barnabas Fund, 2015).

 

Furthermore, Wilson Chowdhry, chair of the British Pakistani Christian Association (BCPA) told the Catholic Herald that “apostasy crime” – committed against Muslims who convert to Christianity – needs to be more widely recognised in Britain. Regarding Mr Hussain’s case, he stated: ‘Police officers seemed oblivious. They didn’t put it down as a hate crime. They had it down as a neighbourhood dispute. That to me was atrocious’ (Catholic Herald 2015).

Police inaction and Shah’s failure to respond to this letter and lack of absence during repeated meetings Nissar set up to discuss his situation in more depth, must be analysed politically. Bradford’s issue with fundamentalism initiated with the public burning of the Satanic Verses , a key turning point being the 2001 riots which polarised factions of the Pakistani community in an already highly concentrated ‘ghettoization’ community structure; of which Nissar’s conversion is deemed treacherous to the wider Islamic Cultural Defence, perceived as opting out of identifying with ethnicity not just religion. This is evident through the National Secular Society’s interview with Anniesa who stated:

 

‘I realised we were different. Mum got asked in the playground, ‘‘why are you wearing salwar kameez, why aren’t you wearing a mini skirt now you’re not a Muslim?’’ Christianity is equated to whiteness. [Mum] said ‘‘my colour is still the same, I’m still a Pakistani woman’’ (National Secular Society 2015).

It is also important to note that, the necessity to avoid repetition of another Bradford riot and the re-election imperative of the local MPs voted in primarily through the Pakistani bloc-vote; the ‘Birardari’ –clan politics – (BBC 2015) system, which are crucial factors in the dismissal of the Hussain case as a religious hate crime by both the police and Naz Shah.

Nissar was interviewed by the Telegraph & Argus following his hospitalisation in which he stated:

“Our lives have been sabotaged because of our faith yet the police have never labelled it as a religious hate crime. It has come to this and the police have failed us. I have no confidence in them .We are under the cosh and classed as blasphemers. The Muslim community are largely decent people but because of the taboo of converting to Christianity we are classed by them as scum and second-class citizens. Most of the Muslim community here have turned a blind eye to what we are going through, there are some who have condoned it but there are also those who are directly committing hate crimes against us. Their objective is to drive us out again. We can’t go on like this. The plan is to move but we can’t do it overnight (Kathie Griffiths in the Telegraph & Argus 2015).

 

The same article also reported that the November attack was now being treated as a religious hate crime, with ‘Detective Inspector Andy Howard, of Bradford District CID, said initial investigations suggested is was a targeted attack and it is being treated as a religious hate crime’ (Telegraphy & Argus 2015). Yet the timing of police classification of the Hussain ordeal as religious hate coincides with the proliferation of interest in the Hussain case, as demonstrated in the tirade of media releases, such as the Daily Mail’s October 2, 2015 article entitled ‘Muslim family are driven from their home… after they converted to Christianity: Neighbours vandalise car and call them ‘blasphemers’ and the 19th November 2015 article, ‘CCTV catches terrifying moment Christian father-of-six was brutally set upon by hooded thugs with a pickaxe handle who targeted him as a ‘’blasphemer’because he converted from Islam’, the Times’ 19th November 2015 article ‘Bradford father ‘living in fear after converting from Islam to Christianity’ and the Yorkshire Post’s 19th November 2015 article entitled ‘Terrifying video shows Bradford dad attacked by pickaxe thugs ‘for converting from Islam to Christianity’ to cite a few examples.

 

Nissar himself confirms this to the BCPA in the following statement:

Yes, they [police] recorded the most brutal attack on me, which was actually attempted murder, as a religious hate crime, but only after the local media named it as such, but in all of the years beforehand, the police force have been downplaying our abuse as a ‘neighbourly dispute’ (BPCA 2016)

 

6.4 Taking a Stand as a Christian convert

The failure of the political and legal system and the lack of freedom of religion in his decision to leave Islam has inspired Nissar to advocate for a specific law guaranteeing the protection of ex-Muslims. The 2015 circulating of the ApostasyByChoice petition online is one example of this.

Moreover, Nissar’s statements of ‘I think multiculturalism has failed, I think David Cameron’s Big Society has failed and I think there is two laws, one for them and one for us’ (Telegraphy & Argus 2015) and ‘I might as well be living in Pakistan, this is not Britain as I know it’ (BBC Asian Network, 2015) provides the contextualisation for the launching of the Safe Haven Project by the Christian Concern organisation, aimed to provide secure relocation for British ex-Muslim Christian converts. Nissar, campaigner and co-founder of Safe Haven said of the initiative: ‘ I am determined not to hide my conversion to Christianity and to do all I can to help the many thousands of other former Muslims, who have either moved away from Islam or need a refuge to escape this type of tyranny’ (Christian Concern, 2014).

The organisation Friends in the West reports Nissar Hussain’s partnership with the BPCA, in meeting with the British Home office, in ‘calling for a Home Office review of hate crime towards so called ‘apostates’ and for such crime to be listed in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006’ (Friends in the West, 2016), prompting a response from Karen Bradley, Minister for Preventing Abuse, Exploitation & Crime documented in two letters dating 27th June 2012:

In an open letter addressed to Mark Burns-Williamson, Police and Crime Commissioner of the West Yorkshire police force, she writes:

‘I recently met Nissar Hussain, a Bradford resident who was involved in a high-profile attack outside his home in November because of his conversion to Christianity…as you are aware, any crime perpetrated on the basis of the victim’s religion should be recorded as a religious hate crime. This includes crimes committed on the basis of the victim’s conversion to a particular faith’ (Home Office, 2016).

In conclusion, the extensive case of the Hussain family in Bradford is interesting to note, as it carries an explicit political undertone not just religious – political opposition from local MPs and police, in addition to political frustrations at the family’s apostasy from the local Muslim communities in which they have resided. Although the plight of the Hussain family continues, with ongoing investigations; the fact remains that in spite of police acknowledgment of targeted persecution towards the Hussains dating back to 2001, the police only officially recognised such criminality as religiously motivated in the immediate aftermath of Nissar’s hospitalisation in November 2015. Additionally, the joint call made by the BPCA and Nissar to insert a specific apostasy clause into British existing Race and Religious legislation, is indicative of the overt failures to guarantee religious freedom for Nissar and his family.

Chapter V: Case studies of the Apostate Experience in Britain

To them [Muslims], it doesn’t really matter if you do the praying stuff, because to them it seems that you just don’t care. But it’s a big deal if you say, ‘yeah I’m not a Muslim’. It changes nothing in your actions or in what you do. But to them it means everything. Because it’s an attack on their life. It’s not ‘Oh, he’s just a bad Muslim’ kind of thing. It’s like, ‘s***, he doesn’t believe’. (‘Hanif’ in Cottee 2005: 11)

 

The 2008 Channel 4 Documentary, ‘Dispatches, Unholy War’ stated that there is an estimated 3,000 underground ex-Muslims currently in Britain, yet the figure stands to be higher given that apostasy remains at the discretion of the individual. However, although the chapter examines the lives of a few British apostates, this is largely due to the stigma and shame attached to the renunciation of the Islamic faith and the necessity to maintain silence as an ex-Muslim living in the shadows. The chapter fundamentally will highlight and conclude that all case apostates do not feel free to state their apostasy openly, as doing so results in disownment, a sense of no belonging in wider society; leading to –in extreme cases- suicide.

 

5.1 Confessions of an ex-Muslim

The publication of Simon Cottee’s (2015) The Apostates: When Muslims leave Islam broke the tide of silence and ignorance enveloping the Apostasy Question in academic literature and policy making, through releasing the first major study of apostasy from Islam in a Western, secular context. Cottee (2015) examines the apostate ordeal primarily through a sociological lens, yet there largely remains a stifling of the internal struggle ex-Muslims undergo within the wider framework of Muslim orthodoxy. Cottee’s (2015) publication must be also placed in the context of the rise of ex-Muslim forums, most notably in Mina Ahadi’s January 2007 founding of the Central Council of ex-Muslims in Germany, Maryam Namazie’s June 2007 co-founding of the Council of ex-Muslims in Britain (CEMB) and Imtiaz Sham’s co-creation of Faith to Faithless; which propelled these formerly marginalised figures into the limelight, thus publicly breaking the taboo of even addressing the Apostasy Question and establishing both public and underground channels of communications for fellow ex-Muslims to share their individual experience and be encouraged in the knowledge they are not alone.

The British ideologue and boasts of freedom of religion was severely destabilised and doubted in the publically documented suicide of 22 year old Pakistani Irtaza Hussain, who abandoned Islam when arriving to the UK for staunch atheism upon the discovery of rationality and science. As an active member of the CEMB he wrote:

Islam quite simply did not provide enough answers at all and was fairly credulous. What is absolutely appalling is the state of ignorance within Muslims and how many of them make claims about Islam’s monopoly on knowledge, yet still being miles away from having a proper appreciation of academia (Irtaza Hussain CEMB, 2013).

 

Cottee (2015) recounts his personal interview with Irtaza, recalling his statements preceding his suicide: ‘I hate not having psychical company…I hate how I’m completely alienated from society and will never find a way to fit in’ (Cottee 2015: 12). The overwhelming lack of acceptance and subsequent loneliness was sensed by Cottee, throughout the case-study interviews he conducted, prompting him to state:

 

There is a lot of pain and torment in the lives of ex-Muslims, This is to do, in part , with feelings of shame: the sense that they’ve failed their families and the wider Muslim community, that they’re not right, that they’re wrong. Not normal. To do, also, with feelings of alienation, a sense of being out of place. Not belonging (Cottee 2015: 13).

 

Irtaza’s final Facebook post in 2013, entitled ‘Just a Jump Away’, depicts him sitting in a tree, his camera lens pointing downwards and a rope in the distance. Faraz Talat, facebook friend to Irtaza, highlights the lack of freedom of belief for those who abandon the Islamic faith in his reminiscent tributary post:

 

22 year old Irtaza Hussain, an ex-Muslim, had cried bitterly for months about being alienated and rebuked by his ultra-conservative British Muslim family. The abuse and unremitting depression led him to his death, while his online friends and I tried helplessly to support him. Battling Islamophobia is a very worthy thing to do, but our empathy is usually too limited to reach deep to the minorities-within-minorities; those we leave behind in the dark, because we can’t figure out a politically correct way to address a situation where a minority community is also an oppressor in some way; not all of them, obviously, but that brutal culture clearly persists. (Faraz Talat Facebook, 2015).

 

 

 

 

Vice News is one of the very few News channels and websites that documents the individual ex-Muslim experience within Britain. In his article Leaving Islam Behind Is a Scary Prospect for Britain’s Ex-Muslims, Kesvani (2013) cites the ordeal of former Muslim Shahid Abbas (pseudo name) in which he forced himself to supress his doubts concerning Islam, as he succumbed to family pressure; particularly his father who encouraged him to become an Imam. However,

“after studying a lot of continental thinkers, as well as more contemporary work about scientific rationalism, there came a point when I realised how flawed Islamic justifications were. I tried to talk about these concerns with the Islamic society, and even the local Imam. But both were very dismissive – they said that the Shai’taan [devil] was trying to manipulate me.” (Kesvani 2013: 1)

 

Abbas’ decision to keep up appearances in relation to the Islamic faith, for fear that his family would disown him is a reoccurring factor within British apostasy. The Independent reports the case of British-Somali, Amal Farah who not only left Islam for atheism but also married a Jew.

 

‘“It was the hardest thing I’ve ever done – telling my observant family that I was having doubts. My mum was shocked; she began to cry. It was very painful for her. When she realised I actually meant it, she cut communication with me,” said Ms Farah. “She was suspicious of me being in contact with my brothers and sisters. She didn’t want me to poison their heads in any way. I felt like a leper and I lived in fear. As long as they knew where I was, I wasn’t safe (Independent 2014).

 

 

The BBC interviewed Ayisha (pseudo name) ,who was 14 when she began doubting Islam after reading the Koran. Her initial battle to wear the hijab culminated in the decision to leave Islam, thus endangering her life at home:

“My dad threatened to kill me by getting a knife and holding it against my neck and saying: ‘We might as well do it if you’re going to bring this much shame to the family… when I came out to my family my auntie told me my brothers and sisters wouldn’t be able to get married because their honour would be tarnished. And it would all be my fault. I used to live in Bradford for a time and I’d be very quiet about it because there are Muslims everywhere. I still have this innate fear, it’s hard to explain. You just want to keep quiet about it. It’s just safe to stay quiet (BBC 2015).

 

In its 2016 documentary Rescuing ex-Muslims: Leaving Islam, Imtiaz Shams, one of the six participant apostates stated that he was unaware he could even leave Islam but upon the revelation that he wanted to, started the London underground Faith to Faithless ex-Muslim network in which they deal with apostates suffering from

emotional abuse, people getting kicked out by their families, a lot of psychological trauma – as an example, in this last Ramadan I had to deal with five different suicide attempts. On the extreme side, things like kidnappings, forced marriage [occur] and risk from the family or wider community (Imtiaz Shams, Vice News 2016) .

 

 

To conclude, the fact that there are only a few, select apostate cases to report on and the fact the Apostasy Question is poorly understood and underreported is that it heavily relies on the apostate him or herself to overcome their paralysis of fear, in order to leave not just a religious ideology but a systematic way of life – everything they have ever known. The utilising of freedom of religion is almost oxymoronic, as the case studies demonstrate a lack of freedom for those apostates who reveal their faithless status to their families and wider communities; forcing them hide or flee and use pseudo names when publically discussing their experiences, for fear of the repercussions on their personal security should those who are intolerant of their decision should ever find them.

This notion of ‘coming out’ -this departure from the Islamic faith as an apostate carries the same undertones and connotations of shame and dishonour as the issue of open homosexuality, another taboo across Muslim communities. The case studies highlight the fear, ostracisation, and abandonment apostates commonly feel, driving them to feel alone, ashamed and deprived of a sense of belonging, resulting in suicide in extreme cases. These individual apostate experiences directly contravene Britain’s guaranteeing of freedom of religion and instead is indicative that perhaps the Muslim Cultural Defence prevails over British and European human rights ideals, which seem to be shunned in the orthodoxy-heterodoxy paradigm of the Islamic communitarian beliefs.

Chapter IV: The Theology on Apostasy

In order to understand Islamic doctrinal basis for the opposition and intolerant attitude to apostates from Islam, it is essential to examine Islamic scripture, doctrine and theological opinion; in order to understand where the justification for persecution – and in extreme cases death – originates from. This chapter aims to present the relevant verses pertaining to apostasy, from the Quran and Hadiths – Islam’s first and second Holy sources. The widely approved and recognised literature on the Hadith by Sahih-al Bukhari, heralded by all Muslim authorities including the spiritual heads of Mecca and Medina , Islam’s first and second holiest shrines will be utilised in order to establish the Prophet Muhammad’s beliefs regarding apostasy. Volume 9 of the Hadith is predominantly littered with examples of Muhammad addressing the fate of apostates.

The chapter will then outline prominent Islamic Schools of Thought and key Islamic figures throughout the Muslim world and diaspora communities, highlighting the debate between literalist and liberalist interpretation , the polarisation of which plays out in the current ‘Islam versus Islamism’ debates and rhetoric; of which the Cultural Defence has emerged from the latter. Although there is a fierce defence of the death penalty for apostasy, the chapter concludes that the majority of modern day Islamic thinkers believe apostasy to be taken out of context and irrelevant as coercion of belief is not permissible in Islam. The theological implications of scriptural verses pertaining to Islam will therefore subsequently be put to the test through the treatment of prolific ex-Muslims in a British context, in order to gauge whether freedom of religion truly exists, yet this will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

 

4.1 Quranic verses pertaining to apostasy

The Muslim scholar Dr Muhammad Hamidullah (1957) states in his book Introduction to Islam that the custodian and repository of the original teachings of Islam is derived from the scripture of the Quran and Hadith – ‘the Quran and the Hadith are the basis of all Islamic law’ (Hamidullah 1957: 163). Furthermore, although

the Quran does not present the reader with a systematic theology on apostasy, its teachings on the seriousness of apostasy, and on non-Muslims became more severe in the verses revealed later in the Medina period. These verses differ from the earlier, Meccan period, which are more tolerant towards non-Muslims. It is widely believed that these later verses have abrogated the earlier ones (Meral 2008:20).

 

Quranic verses pertaining to apostasy

 1. [Your enemies] will not cease to fight against you till they have turned you away from your faith, if they can. But if any of you should turn away from his faith and die as a denier of truth- these it is whose works will go for nought in this world and in the life to come; and these it is who are destined for the fire, therein to abide (2:217).

 2. How would God bestow His guidance upon people who have resolved to deny truth after having attained to faith, and having borne witness that this Apostle is true, and [after]4all evidence of the truth has come unto them? For God does not guide such evildoing folk. Their requital shall be rejections by God, and by the angels, and by all [righteous] people (3:86-87).

3. Truly, as for those who are bent on denying the truth after having attained to faith and then grow [ever more stubborn] in their refusal to acknowledge the truth, their repentance [of other sins] shall not be accepted: for it is they who have truly gone astray (3:90).

4. They would have you disbelieve as they themselves have disbelieved, so that you may be all like alike. Do not befriend them until they have fled their homes for the cause of God. If they desert you seize them and put them to death wherever you find them. Look for neither friends not helpers among them… (4:89).

5. But as for him who, after guidance has been given to him, cuts himself off from the Apostle and follows a path other than that of the believers- him shall We leave unto that which he himself has chosen, and shall cause him to endure hell… (4:115).

6. They swear by God that they said nothing (evil), but indeed they uttered blasphemy and they did it after accepting Islam; and they meditated a plot which they were unable to carry out: this revenge of theirs was (their) only return for the bounty with which God and His Apostle had enriched them! If they repent, it will be best for them; but if they turn back (to their evil ways), God will punish them with a grievous penalty in this life and in the Hereafter: they shall have none on earth to protect or help them (9:74).

 

Quranic verses permitting freedom of religion

1.Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error: whoever rejects Evil and believes in God hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And God heareth and knoweth all things (2:256).
2. And if they surrender themselves unto Him, they are on the right path; but if they turn away- behold, your duty is no more than to deliver the message (3:20).

3. Means of insight have now come unto you from your Sustainer [through his divine writ]. Whoever, therefore, chooses to see, does so for his own good; and whoever chooses to remain blind, does so his own hurt. And [say unto the blind of heart]: ‘I am not your keeper (6:104).

4. It rests with God alone to show you the right path: yet there is [many a one] who swerves from it. However, had He so willed, He would have guided you all aright (16:9).(Source Meral 2008: 20-33)

 

Hadith verses pertaining to apostasy

 

 1. Allah’s Apostle said, “The blood of a Muslim who confesses that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that I am His Apostle, cannot be shed except in three cases: In Qisas for murder, a married person who commits illegal sexual intercourse and the one who reverts from Islam (apostate) and leaves the Muslims (Volume 9, Book 83, Number 17). 

2. Some Zanadiqa (atheists) were brought to ‘Ali and he burnt them. The news of this event, reached Ibn ‘Abbas who said, “If I had been in his place, I would not have burnt them, as Allah’s Apostle forbade it, saying, ‘Do not punish anybody with Allah’s punishment (fire).’ I would have killed them according to the statement of Allah’s Apostle, ‘Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him’ (volume 9 Book 84, number 57). 

3. Behold: There was a fettered man beside Abu Muisa. Mu’adh asked, “Who is this (man)?” Abu Muisa said, “He was a Jew and became a Muslim and then reverted back to Judaism.” Then Abu Muisa requested Mu’adh to sit down but Mu’adh said, “I will not sit down till he has been killed. This is the judgment of Allah and His Apostle (for such cases) and repeated it thrice. Then Abu Musa ordered that the man be killed, and he was killed (volume 9 Book 84, number 58).

 

 4. No doubt I heard Allah’s Apostle saying, “During the last days there will appear some young foolish people who will say the best words but their faith will not go beyond their throats (i.e. they will have no faith) and will go out from (leave) their religion as an arrow goes out of the game. So, where-ever you find them, kill them, for who-ever kills them shall have reward on the Day of Resurrection (Volume 9, Book 84, Number 64)  

 

Leading Mujtahid (Jurists’) Interpretation on Apostasy

The three main Islamic schools of thought – Malik, Hanbali and Hanafi schools categorically uphold the death penalty as the ultimate consequence for apostasy from Islam. The Malik school espouses that

 

‘whoever changes his religion should be executed. As far as we can understand this command of the Prophet means that the person who leaves Islam to follow another way, but conceals his kufr and continues to manifest Islamic belief, as is the pattern of the Zindiqs and others like them, should be executed after his guilt has been established. He should not be asked to repent because the repentance of such persons cannot be trusted. But the person who has left Islam and publicly chooses to follow another way should be requested to repent. If he repents, good. Otherwise, he should be executed’ (Malik 1994: 317).

 

Similarly, the Hanbali School adheres to the interpretation of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal who states that ‘any adult and rational man or woman who renounces Islam and chooses kufr should be given a three day period to repent. The person who does not repent should be executed’ (Mawdudi 1994: 17). The Hanafi School, followers of Imam Abu Hanifah offers no possibility for remorse for those well versed in Islamic doctrine: ‘the person who understands Islam well and deliberately renounces Islam, should be executed without any invitation to repentance’ (Mawdudi 1994: 17).

 

The Contemporary Islamic Scholarly debate on Apostasy

 

Islamic debate concerning the Apostasy Question dates back to the time of Muhammad yet there remains no single accepted consensus as to the treatment of ex-Muslims. Instead, the fate of apostates is contingent upon the literalist versus liberalist interpretation and contextualisation of Islamic doctrine pertaining to apostasy, a struggle that remains contemporary to the Muslim world.

 

The literalist interpretation of the Quran and Hadiths in relation to apostasy is adhered to by al-Shafi’i (767- 820 CE), who understands Quran (2: 217) as justification for the death penalty. Similarly, Abdul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), one of the founders of the Indian Islamic and politically conservative organisation Jamat-i Islami , stated in his book The Punishment of the Apostate that Islamic scripture permits the killing of those who desert the faith.

 

This literalist approach conflicts with liberal scholarly rhetoric, espoused by figures such as Shakyh Muhammad Sayyid Tantani, Grand Imam of al-azhar since 1996, in believing that those Muslims who renounce their belief should be left alone – unless he poses a threat to Islam. Additionally, the Islamic department of al-azhar university ‘has called for the penalty for apostasy to be null and void’ (Subhani 2005: 25), extending the timeframe in which the apostate can repent and revert to Islam, from three days to the apostates’ lifetime. Technically speaking therefore, this allows the apostate to renounce his faith repeatedly then revert back whenever he wishes to over the course of his life. Furthermore, Sheikh Gamal al-Banna, Egyptian thinker, author and journalist states in an article entitled No Punishment for Ridda: Freedom of thought is the backbone for Islam: ‘these verses are clear with regard to ridda in Islam; they make no mention of any torture, punishment for the murtadd in this world…the only dreadful and terrifying punishment is the rage of Allah’ ( Council of American-Islamic Relations 2015:1 ) .

 

Renowned European Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan, furthers this liberalist interpretation through highlighting case examples of Muhammad’s tolerance towards those individuals who left Islam during his lifetime, ‘such as Hisham and Ayyash, or who converted to Christianity such as Ubaydallah ibn Jahsh’ , indicating therefore that ‘the one who changes his or her religion should not be killed’ (Berkley Centre 2007:1). Moreover, the British anti-extremist Muslim think tank, Quilliam Foundation in its 2013 No Compulsion in Religion: Islam & Freedom of Belief report repeatedly asserts that the act of renunciation is between man and God, therefore the notion of an earthly punishment is against the teachings of Islam.

 

In conclusion, it is evident that a strong case for the death penalty emerges for apostates, particularly demonstrative in the acts of killing as outlined in the Hadith. Since there is no clear, structural passage on apostasy, those verses that address the issue of apostasy appear to contradict, some upholding the necessity to kill the disbeliever, whilst others upholding freedom of belief; it is essential then to turn to scholars of such Scripture to provide coherency and correction to confusion and confliction of Islamic doctrine concerning the fate of the apostate. Despite the majority of scholars opposing the death penalty for the ex-Muslim, the persecution of apostates continues to rise in the orthodoxy-heterodoxy context; thereby initiating doubt as to whether freedom of religion toward the apostate truly exists.

Chapter III: Orthodoxy v Heterodoxy

From Muhammad bin Muslim who said, “I asked (Imam) Abu Ja`far (al-Baqir) about the murtad [infidel].” He said, “Whoever turns away from Islam and rejects what has been revealed to Muhammad after he had been a Muslim, then there is no repentance for him; rather it is obligatory to kill him; and his wife should separate from him, and his wealth should be distributed among his heirs (Sarwar 2007:256) .

 

This chapter examines the issue of polarisation within the Muslim community, analysing the internal dissenters in an orthodoxy-heterodoxy type-paradigm. This internal Muslim crisis will be highlighted through the fate of prominent dissenters, through opposition of Islamist Blasphemy laws – as demonstrated through the killing of Pakistani Governor Salman Taseer, through perceived heresy – as evidenced in the murder of Glasgow’s Ahmadiyyah Asad Shah and through apostasy; most notably in the current imprisonment of Saudi Arabia’s Raif Badawi, unusually propelling the issue of apostasy into the international media. Statistical data, in the form of surveys undertaken in the Islamic world will be utilised in order to show that the overwhelming support for the death penalty and Sharia law, a politicised Islamic jurisdiction system derived from a literal interpretation of the Quran, is not just adhered by Muslim nations. Instead, globalisation enables British Muslim communities to stay informed of the grievances or issues of salience in their countries of origin, perpetuating an attachment of Islamic ideals over British values throughout factions of Muslims, which essentially intensifies the Cultural Defence. Consequently, internal heterodoxy against the predominant orthodox nature of such Muslim communities is silenced, suppressed and in extreme cases, murdered.

 

3.1 The Internal Muslim Crisis

The religious fundamentalism behind the Cultural Defence has directly created the orthodoxy versus heterodoxy paradox, in which the former’s rigid and dogmatic belief that it remains fundamentally incompatible with differing ideologies, also applies to the internal Islamic structure. Whilst the purpose of inter-faith and multi-faith rhetoric and institutions is to engage Islamic beliefs with other religions across Britain and to encourage a better perspective of Muslims from an external standpoint; currently there exists a significant lack of understanding of the internal, differing Islamic ideologies – nor does a prolific and vastly-connected liaising forum function between the mainstream Sunni branch of Islam and alternative sects.

 

Kymlica (1995) posits a challenge to the correlation between the Cultural Defence and Orthodoxy/Heterodoxy paradox. In utilising Taylor’s (1994) Politics of Recognition he advocates a theory of cultural liberalism in contrast to a cultural defence in stating that ‘minority rights are compatible with cultural liberalism when a) individual freedom is protected within the group and b) they promote equality and not domination between groups’ (Kymlica 1995: 153). However, Kymlica’s (1995) reference to a cultural liberalism proves to be rather utopianist when applies to the British Muslim community; particularly when considering the conditions upon which the (Sunni) cultural defence was formed.

 

The feeling of being scapegoated by an external, imperialist, non-Muslim hierarchy, reinforces this Islamic sub-culture which is therefore arguably less tolerant of internal strife, such as acts or speeches deemed blasphemous to mainstream Sunni beliefs or cases of apostasy – all of which are perceived as threats to the attempt of uniting the Ummah. Microcosm realism therefore, in the form of community security politics takes precedent within this inflexible socio-religious framework, in which the determination of individualism is worth comparatively less against the wider autonomy of communitarianism. This runs parallel to ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘reflexive thinking’ (Giddens 1999) which espouses tolerance to all views and beliefs within the community.

 

The issue of blasphemy continues to remain highly topical and deeply contentious in not only the Islamic world but within the Muslim diaspora as evidenced in the European cartoon depictions of Muhammad and the Salman Rushdie affair. The latest Pew research centre analysis on the criminalisation of blasphemy reveals that 26% of the globe’s countries and territories hold anti-blasphemy laws and policies (Pew, 2016), concentrated across the Middle East and North African (MENA) regions and South Asia.

The Blasphemy Question is fuelled by deep intolerance and heightened sensitivity towards a perceived attack on Allah, Muhammad and/or the Koran, as demonstrated in the ‘US court order that Youtube remove the Innocence of Muslims film, due to its negative portrayal of Muhammad’ (The Legal Project, 2014) . In recent years, the violence now almost synonymous with the globalised anti-blasphemy campaigns, demonstrations and vengeance has gained momentum; whether witnessed in the 2014 torching of a Lebanese library ‘after pamphlets were found, insulting to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad’ (Spencer 2014:1 ), or in the ongoing Bangladesh blogger murders – the latest murder reported to be the hacking of Xulhaz Mannan in Dhaka, in April 2016 (Washington Post, 2016).

 

However, it was the 2015 killing of Farkhunda Malikzada in Afghanistan, of which the accusation of burning copies of the Koran, culminated in a mob frenzied lynching and subsequent burning of her body; spilling across global headlines as yet another harrowing reminder of the intolerant attitude towards ‘dissenters’, or ‘blasphemers’ against the increased orthodoxy of factions of Muslim communities in the context of preserving the sanctity of Islam.

 

 

3.2 Tainted with Blasphemy: From Pakistan to the UK

 

A poignant example of the orthodoxy/heterodoxy paradox within the British Muslim community lies in the March 2016 murder of Glasgow shopkeeper, Asad Shah by Tanveer Ahmed of Bradford. The BBC (2016) investigation into the incident concluded that ‘the accused’s consistent and repeated account as to his motivation for murdering Asad Shah was that Shah claimed to be a prophet, which so offended his feelings and his faith that he had to kill him’ (BBC, 2016), yet context of the Sunni versus Ahmadiyya conflict is key to understanding the wider persecution of the minority Islamic sect, before addressing the implications of blasphemy which drove Ahmed to murder Shah.

 

The religious conflict between the Ahmadiyya Muslims and ‘main-stream’ Islam is as old as the establishment of this movement in India by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) in the late nineteenth century and given its rejection of Muhammad as the final Prophet of Islam, have relentless persecution in Pakistan –‘ since 1974, the Ahmadi population in Pakistan has fallen from several million to 400,000 , including the massacre of approximately 100 people by the Taliban in Lahore in 2010’ (Guardian 2016). Contentions and internal strife between the two sects are ongoing, with the Sunni branch condemning the Ahmadi, so much so that in 1974, Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, introduced a constitutional amendment that declared Ahmadi to be non-Muslims.

 

In the wake of the Glasgow murder, Mezzofiore (2016), reporting in Mashable UK stated that representatives of the Glasgow Central Mosque and the Muslim Council of Scotland shunned the launch of an anti-extremism campaign in Scotland organised by Ahmadis, which the

 

Ahmadi claim that decision reflects a general attitude of scepticism in the Sunni Muslim community towards them… many in mainstream Islam still believe the group does not belong in extended family…the message of hate is spreading and affecting Ahmadi children. And sectarianism doesn’t just stop at Ahmadi, it also affects Shia and other Muslims sects. (Mashable UK, 2016).

 

Moreover, the April 2016 discovery of ‘kill Ahmadiyya’ (BBC, 2016) leaflets in Stockwell Green mosque, propagating Khatme Nubuwwat rhetoric –an established anti-Ahmadi ideological organisation is further indication of the intolerance towards heterogeneous Muslim sects within the wider Islamic framework. However, it is imperative to note that the murder of Shah very much remains a case of blasphemy, of which his killer’s motive must be placed in correlation with the institutionalisation of Section 295 of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Penal Code.

 

The infamous imprisonment of Pakistan’s Aasiya Bibi, originally jailed in 2009 for allegedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad perhaps stands as the global symbol of Islamic blasphemy, as she awaits to potentially become the first nation’s first case of execution via the Penal code. Bibi’s imprisonment must be contextualised within the systematic application of the Penal code, examined by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in a 1991 Amnesty International report, stating that ’34 people were charged in 2013 alone, with at least 16 people currently reported on death row for blasphemy and 20 serving life sentences’ (Amnesty International 1994: 15).

 

However, the reaction to the murder of Punjabi Governor’s Salman Taseer, an outspoken critic of the ordeal of Aasiya Bibi and Pakistan’s draconian blasphemy laws in 2011 and the following reaction to the hanging of the perpetrator is crucial to the understanding of Asad Shah’s murder in 2016. Taseer’s murder demonstrated the level of religiosity amongst Pakistani Muslims, as seen through Qadri being

‘showered with rose petals and kissed by lawyers at his first court appearance with the judge who convicted Qadri having to flee the country… a mosque in Islamabad was named in honour of Qadri and the country’s army chief at the time reportedly told western ambassadors he could not publicly condemn him because too many of his soldiers sympathised with the killer‘ (2016: 1) .

 

Ayesha Nasir, writing in the TIME newspaper stated Taseer’s opposition to the blasphemy laws was hugely unpopular among a large segment of Pakistanis, an example of which is evident through ‘a statement issued by Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, a prominent religious organization that represents the Barelvi movement of Sunni Muslims, urging Pakistanis not to express regret over Taseer’s murder’ (Nasir 2016: 1 TIME). Furthermore, Aljazeera (2016) cited the statement released by Tahir Iqbal Chistie, president of the Sunni Tehreek organisation:

“At this time, the sentiments of all Muslims have been injured, and our feelings have been badly hurt. For any Muslim believer – no matter what school of thought he belongs to…he sent to hell a person who showed disrespect for the holy Prophet. What he did was according to the orders of the Quran…’ (Aljazeera 2016).

 

Yet the lack of remorse felt by the Islamist factions of Pakistan is a sharp contrast to the outpour of outrage at Qadri’s death sentence in early 2016, with news of his hanging provoking thousands to protest and stand in solidarity as witnessed through the ‘#IamMumtazQadri , which became one of the top trends on Twitter on the day of his funeral’ (Kilji 2016:1). This detailed and recent contextualisation is imperative to note as the notion of this blasphemous mentality is not confined to Pakistan’s Muslims, rather it is accepted by factions of British Pakistanis as one example of the religious Cultural Defence.

 

For example, the National Secular Society highlighted the public affiliation of Bradford-based Imam Muhammad Asim Hussain with Qadri’s murder in his following Facebook post: ‘today is a dark day in the history of Pakistan; the day … Mumtaz [Qadri] was wrongfully executed and martyred in the way of Allah, when he did what he did in honour of the Prophet’ (National Secular Society 2016) generating nearly 4,000 likes out of his 100,000 followers. The timing of Quadri’s execution came one month prior to Bradford’s Tanveer Ahmed murder of Asad Shah, a blatant indication of globalised Islamic orthodoxy, which inspires killing in the of blasphemy and against heterodoxy in Muslim communities from Pakistan to the UK.

 

 

3.3 State reaction to Apostasy in the Muslim world

When engaged in the orthodoxy versus heterodoxy debate, the subject of murtad , or apostasy is fundamentally important since this act of the renunciation of the Islamic faith signifies the epitome of heterodoxy within the Islamic world or Muslim communities, demonstrating the blatant refusal to comply with the Islamic system of life and therefore an affront to the Cultural Defence. The issue of apostasy is generally unknown in the non-Muslim world in spite of significant Muslim minorities, most probably because the diaspora are typically unwilling to engage in what has generally become a taboo topic given the connotations of dishonour and embarrassment internal, Islamic disagreements introduce to communities striving for a united front; particularly in western/European political contexts in which factions of the Muslim community feel they are continuously striving to display positive imagery of Islam.

 

Whilst there is no explicit reference to murtad in the Koran, there are indeed scriptural implications which provide theological hostility and intolerance to dissenters or deserters of the Islamic message. For example, Sura 9:73 -74 states:

Prophet, make war on the unbelievers and the hypocrites and deal rigorously with them. Hell shall be their home: an evil fire. They swear by God that they said nothing. Yet they uttered the word of unbelief and renounced Islam after embracing it.. If they repent, it will indeed be better for them, but if they give no heed, God will sternly punish them, both in this world and in the world to come

 

Furthermore, Sura 47:23-28 states:

If you renounced the faith, you would surely do evil in the land, and violate the ties of blood. Such are those on whom God has laid His curse, leaving them deaf and sightless…. Those who return to unbelief after God’s guidance has been revealed to them are seduced by Satan and inspired by him….

 

The selected verses of the Koran delivering instruction as to how renouncers of the faith should be perceived and the proclamation of predestined hellfire for those who do not share the same religious belief, provides the very theological contextual basis for Islamic polities globally. The idea that those who ‘renounce the faith would surely do evil in the land and violate the ties of blood’ is indeed a common insecurity for those Islamic states who pre-eminently criminalise apostasy or instil laws that officiate Islam as the sole religion; as evidenced in Malaysia and the Maldives for example. This sura versus also feeds into the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ paradigm, therefore enabling a perception that internal dissenters and/or apostates are traitorous and therefore a deep offence to the sanctity of Islam.

 

The Pew Research Centre conducted a survey predominantly across Muslim countries of most global regions, in order to gauge the level of strict adherence to a literal interpretation of Islam, one key tenet being the belief and desire to be governed by Sharia law; of which Hudud (death sentence) is currently proscribed to apostasy in the Islamic world . Figure 4 explicitly analyses the percentage of Muslims who believe in execution for apostasy to another religion. Such ‘measures were in effect in more than half the countries in the Middle East-North Africa region (11 of 20, or 55%) as well as in five of the 50 countries in the Asia-Pacific region (10%) and four of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (8%)’ (Pew Research Centre 2013: 55) only exempting Europe and the American regions.

 

The main findings of the report found that 84% of Pakistani, 82% of Bangladeshi, 99% of Afghan and 91% of Iraqi  participants believe that sharia law should replace the official law of their respective nations and this is crucial to note. Given that the primary focus of the dissertation aims to analyse the Apostasy from Islam situation in the United Kingdom, there are significant numbers of the ‘Pakistani (370, 779), Bangladeshi (142, 718) and Middle Eastern (178, 195) ‘ (The Muslim Council of Britain, 2011: 24) diasporas that despite residing in Britain, continue to revere sharia law albeit mostly within segregated Muslim communities. This will be illustrated through the case examples of British ex-Muslim experiences in Chapters 5 and 6. Specifically examining British Muslim opinion regarding Sharia law, the Policy Exchange think tank conducted a survey of 1,000 participants in 2007, concluding that despite 59% of Muslims who would prefer to live under British law, compared with 28% who would prefer to live under Sharia law, ‘37% of 16-24 year olds prefer Sharia compared with 17% of over-55s’ ( Mirza, Senthilkumaran, Ja’far 2007:5 ) .

 

Furthermore, out of the 1,000 participants, ‘86% of Muslims feel that religion is the most important thing in their life, with 36% of 16 to 24-year-olds believing that should a Muslim convert to another religion, he/she should be punished by death, compared with 19% of over-55s’ (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, Ja’far 2007:5). Placing these results (albeit slightly outdated) into the larger context and more recent Pew findings of the orthodoxy versus heterodoxy paradigm, it is evident that the attachment and preference for religiosity – of which Sharia law is one tenet of such – indicating therefore the severe plight of especially apostates in their ultimate renunciation of the faith.

 

3.4 The case of Apostasy in the international media

The phenomenon of apostasy remains largely unknown in particularly the non-Muslim world, only recently transitioning into the spotlight mainly through human rights groups, religious advocacy or non-governmental organisations. Very rarely do cases of apostasy break out into the national and international spotlight, primarily because of the blatant offence, dishonour and ostracisation of those apostate individuals.

 

The infamous Lina Joy versus Majlis Agama Islam (2007) Malaysian case is an excellent example of the orthodoxy versus heterodoxy struggle with specific regards to apostasy. The constitutional definition of the Malay race is synonymous with Islamic belief, thereby making the act of conversion to another religion illegal; or at the very least exceptionally difficult. Yet Malaysia’s constitution ‘does not impose any restriction on a person’s right or capacity to accept or reject any religion, including the religion of Islam, as religious freedom enshrined under Article 11 (1) of the Constitution is available to Muslims and non-Muslims alike’ (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 153). The legal implications of Joy’s case suggests otherwise.

 

Joy’s (whose original birth name is Azlina Jailani), conversion to Christianity required authentication by the state, in applying ‘ first to the National Registration Department (NRD) and then the Court of Appeal to remove “Islam” (as her official religion) from her identity papers’ (Catholic News, 2007) in order for her marriage to her Christian boyfriend to become legitimised in accordance with state law.

 

However, the application of Sharia law upon all Islamic matters denied Joy the right to remove Islam from her religious identity card. In concluding the case, Federal Court Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim stated that ‘you can’t at whim and fancy convert from one religion to another,’ (Reuters 2007). The implications of the case set a precedent for apostasy from Islam in a Malaysian context, where the latest Sharia Hudud Bill that passed in the Kelantan state in March 2015, proved that apostasy, in addition to other Islamic ‘crimes’ could now in extreme cases enact the death penalty.

 

Perhaps the prevailing example of heterodoxy within a Muslim context is the 2012 imprisonment of Raif Badawi, who is heralded as the symbol of apostasy through the international furore and human rights led opposition and outcry at his ordeal by the Saudi government, as he awaits his possible execution. Badawi’s Free Saudi Liberals blog, ‘violates Islamic values and propagates liberal thought’ (Raif Badawi Foundation, 2012) through espousing liberal/secular rhetoric such as ‘you have the right to express and think whatever you want as you have the right to declare what you think about it, it is your right to believe or think, have the right to love and to hate, from your right to be a liberal or Islamist’ (Independent, 2015).

 

The International Business Times reported a facebook statement by Badawi’s family :

Due to a new regulation issued by the Supreme Judicial Council on 19th September 2014 , the Penal court has now jurisdiction over major cases, which are punishable by the death penalty, amputation and stoning. We have reasons to believe without any doubts that the judge has again asked the Head of the Court of Appeal to charge Raif with ‘Apostasy’ (International Business Times, 2015).

 

In conclusion, it is evident that heterodoxy within a Muslim context is largely unacceptable. The cases of Malaysia’s Lina Joy and the ongoing deliberations concerning the fate of Raif Badawi are two examples of the extremity of intolerance of heterogeneity against the systematic governance and application of orthodoxy in the Muslim world. Yet it is important to note that this psyche of Islamic religiosity is not confined to Muslim countries, as the creation of the Cultural Defence within a Western context holds its roots in this very psyche and application of strict, Sharia practices. Fundamentally, apostasy is a globalised phenomenon, existing as the extremity of heterodoxy throughout Muslim communities yet it is fundamentally a rare phenomenon and a taboo, partly silenced by the overarching orthodox hierarchy and partly silenced by the potentially brutal consequences individuals face, should news of his/her renunciation of faith and/or conversion to another religion surface.

Chapter II: The Multiculturalism Backlash

I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that the author of the Satanic Verses book, which is against Islam, the Prophet and the Koran and all those involved in its publication, who were aware of its content, are sentenced to death. 

Ayatollah Khomeini (London Evening Standard, February 14, 1989)

 

This chapter examines the failures of assimilative policies for ethnic minorities, explicitly with regards to Muslims in the wake of the 1989 Salman Rushdie affair, in which Muslim previous identification with ‘non-whiteness’ converted to a strengthened perception of an Islamic identity; marking a departure with a shared identity with other non-white, immigrant and ethnic minorities. The chapter will highlight the British Muslim community’s push for an Islamic agenda, with data to indicate the rise of religiosity and attachment to Muslim ideals, making reference to the depleting levels of Christianity and examples of de-Christianisation within wider Europe and the United Kingdom. The chapter will finally introduce the concept of the Cultural Defence, in which the anger at British political reaction to the Salman Rushdie affair marked the beginning of a notable retreat into internal, Muslim communities, before concluding that parallel systems have since been created within the larger, British society.

 

2.1 From Race to Religion

The impassioned Muslim campaign against the publication of Rushdie’s Satanic Verses set a precedent for British race-relations, minorities and multiculturalist politics, in addition to redefining the Muslim identity through the Cultural Defence. The sense of a collective British identity in a decolonised, egalitarian multiculturalism context, is challenged on many fronts, perhaps most notably however in the Parekh (2000) Report on The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. Parekh (2000) argues that:

‘Britishness as much as Englishness has systematic racial connotations; Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that Englishness and therefore by extension, Britishness is racially coded’ (Parekh 2000: 38).

 

Parekh (2000) alludes to this sense of institutionalised colonialism which is a reaction to the racial rhetoric espoused by Enoch Powell in stating ‘the West Indian or Asian does not, by being born in England become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or Asian still’ (Powell in Smithies & Fiddick 1969: 77) . This concept of ‘Britishness’ remains current within domestic politics, where:

 

‘Politicians stress the need to reassert ‘‘core values’’ against those thought at odds with them. There is alarm about ghettoization, communal separatism, exclusion and demands that immigrants learn English and declare their loyalty to the nation-state in which they reside; rather than the one whence they came and with which many retained significant ties’ (Grillo in Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010: 53).

 

This condition of fear in which the extremities of right-wing politics feeds upon, is the context in which the infamous race riots of St Pauls (1980),Brixton (1981, 1985), Toxeth (1981), Chapeltown (1981) , Moss Side (1981) and Handsworth (1985) took place. It is important to note that religion was not considered an issue – rather a matter of race, evidenced by numerous reactionary organisations such as the Coordinating Community Against Racial Discrimination, Black People’s Alliance and Asian Youth Movement, which repeatedly banded together around cross-cultural issues such as ‘racial attacks, police brutality, housing discrimination’ (Lentin, Alana, Titley, Gavan 2011 :22) at a time where ethnicity and non-whiteness was a common denominator and therefore solidified as a bloc-identity across the spectrum of Commonwealth immigrants.

 

Thus, the publication of the Satanic Verses in 1989 was therefore a watershed moment in British multicultural politics, signalling an irrevocable departure from the collective ethnic-bloc identity and replacing it with an ‘identity versus identification’ (Findlay, Hoy, Stockdale 2004: 75) struggle, as factions of Muslims utilised the Cultural Defence as a justification tool for the disregard for freedom of speech. The violent reactionary campaign entrenched the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, officially questioning whether egalitarian multiculturalism was applicable within the UK; with a specific focus on Muslims. The infamous public burning of the Verses triggered deep symbolism of intolerance that swept across most of the Islamic world and Muslim diaspora, producing the very conditions in which British newspapers and televisions almost unanimously condemned the fundamentalism of Britain’s Muslims.

 

The re-emergence of internal British imperialist undertones in addressing the Salman Rushdie Affair provided the very foundations for an ideological shift, overturning the ethnic identification with race and replacing it with religion. Political commentary and opinion in the aftermath of the Affair now directed its condemnation towards the Muslim community. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd and Minister John Patten led the forefront of such condemnation in stating that ‘one cannot be British on one’s own exclusive terms or on a selective basis’ (Independent July 20, 1989). Furthermore in a letter entitled ‘Dangers of the Muslim campaign’ the Independent stated:

 

The present government does not often forcefully represent the views of left-of-centre intellectuals…but the recent observation of John Patten, Minister of State at the Home Office, responsible for Race Relations, on the need for the Muslim community to integrate with British society; have broadly echoed the view of liberal opinions… if Britain’s more extreme Muslims ignore Patten’s advice and continue to adopt hardline positions, they are likely to turn educated, as well as popular sentiments against them’ (Independent, 1989).

 

Asad (1990) challenges the implications behind the frequentative rhetoric of liberty and ‘Britishness’, believing the political elite to patronise the Muslim community upon the further release of the ‘On Being British’ document. He cites the work of Culls and Dodds’ (1987) Englishness, Politics and Culture who state: ‘the Tory government and ‘liberal opinion’ in Britain sensed a danger, a perceived threat to a particular ideological structure, a cultural hierarchy organised around an essential Englishness, which defines British identity’ (Culls & Dodds 1987: 21).

 

The recycling of internal colonisation and psyche of patriarchal subjugation feeds into the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ paradigm within the Muslim community, into a context of historical institutionalised racial tensions and inequality. Ultimately therefore, the denouncing of the global Islamic reaction to the Satanic Verses, at a time where Iran’s Ayatollah had issued a fatwa to the Umma in killing Rushdie, and the refusal to adhere to British Muslim calls to apply blasphemy legislation to cases of defamation to Islam inevitably paved way for the religious Cultural Defence, in addition to creating a polarisation of left and right wing politics in relation to how Islam is portrayed in Britain and wider Europe.

 

This creation of an Islamic sub-culture, as an alternative system of governance within an overarching framework of British norms, complies with the work of Gilroy (2000 ) and Bhabha (1989), who fundamentally argue that egalitarian multiculturalism cannot effectively be implemented as ‘culture is not a fixed and impermeable feature of social relations. They have been able to detach cultural practises from their origins and use them to found and extend the new pattern of metacommunication which gives their community substance and collective identity’ (Gilroy 2000 :217) Gilroy’s theory of fluid, transnational cultural attachment and affiliation fits well with those factions of especially segregated Muslim communities across Britain who have proven unwilling to assume ‘Britishness’ wholly, to the extent where unflattering depictions and literature of their Prophet is not permissible in accordance with western enshrined freedom of expression.

 

Moreover, Bhahba (1989) applies this to the Salman Rushdie affair:

 

Salman Rushdie sees the emergence of doubt, questioning and even confusion as being part of that cultural ‘’excess’’ that facilitates the formation of new social identities that do not appeal to a pure and settled past, or to a unicultural present, in order to authenticate themselves. The authority lies in the attempt to articulate emergent, hybrid forms of cultural identity’ (Bhahba 1989: 45).

 

The notion of a hybrid cultural identity with regards to British multiculturalism has undergone a mutation to specifically include faith-based multiculturalism, evident in the 1997 establishment of Islamic faith schools for example and acknowledging racism through a religious proxy ; most notably by revamping of previous Racial Acts to the current 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act. Modood (2003) emphasises the instrumental role the Satanic Verses played in the enshrining of anti-Muslim discrimination, contending that this ideological, left-wing shift was not a top-bottom enforcement, but reflected the increasing demand to recognise religion as a public and private indispensable identity reference.

2.2 The de-Christianisation of the United Kingdom/Europe

The rise of the Muslim Cultural Defence must be placed within two contexts: the first against the backdrop of a general de-Christianisation of Europe, in which Islam has plugged the religious vacuum and the second is the political polarisation of left and right wing attitudes towards the public expansion of the Islamic Question. Both conditions has served to facilitate Muslim consciousness of their cultural-religious identity.

The process of post-modernity throughout Europe is continuous and current, recently and infamously demonstrated through the European Court of Human Right’s (ECHR) 2010 Lautsi versus Italy ruling which prompted debate as to whether crucifixes in Italian schools should be permissible, as the presence of them ‘violates a child’s right to freedom of religion’ (Martin 2009:1). This challenge to traditional Italian practises set a precedent for all European Union (EU) member states, questioning the conventional display of Christian symbolism within public institutions.

This set an inexorable trend, as evidenced in the 2014 Travelodge removal of King James Bibles (Daily Mail 2014) in the UK and the rise in cases of Christian discrimination in the workplace. The 2004 case of Lillian Ladele who claimed Islington Council discriminated against her in her refusal to conduct civil partnerships and the 2006 case of Nadia Ewedia, who was informed by British Airways that her crucifix necklace violated uniform code (BBC, 2013) are illustrative of the preference for secularity in Britain and wider Europe, particularly since such discrimination directly contravenes the Equality Act 2010 which theoretically guarantees religious protection under UK equality opportunity laws in addition to existing international legal provisions.

 

Such examples of de-Christianisation is framed within the ‘Britain is no longer a Christian country and should stop acting as if it is’ (Bingham & Swinford 2015:1) rhetoric. The release of Baroness Butler-Sloss’ Commission on Religion and Belief in Public Life (2015) effectively summarises that ‘the decline of churchgoing and the rise of Islam and other faiths means a ‘’new settlement’’ is needed for religion in the UK, giving more official influence to non-religious voices and those of non-Christian faiths’ (Telegraph 2015)

 

Further to the Commission’s findings, the British Humanist Association (BHA) conducted a religious survey across Britain in 2009, entitled ‘What is your religion?’ with 61% of participants opting for a religious option (53.5% Christian, 7.2% non-Christian) , whilst 39% considered themselves not religious.

 

In 2015, the Yougov poll conducted a repeat of the BHA survey, thereby discovering 49% of participants regarding themselves to be religious whilst 42% did not. The Church of England is experiencing a plummet in church membership, from 40.3% in 1983 to 16.3% in 2014 ( BHA,2014), yet the belief in modernity and secularity in Europe cannot be wholly applied to Islam, ‘which rejects a dualistic worldview that would compartmentalise areas of life into the religious/sacred versus the sacred/profane. Islam will not readily acquiesce to the privatisation of belief and practise that Christians have undergone’ (Leigh 2013 :5) and this demonstrated in the rise of Islamic institutions in contrast to the decline of Christian places of worship.

 

2.4 The Cultural Defence

The European/Western trauma triggered by the events of 9/11 manifested itself through the increase of polarised left or right-wing ‘camps’, in addition to legitimising these political definitions or labels in specific relation to Muslims. The ‘leftist’ camp applies sensitivity towards ‘Muslim’ issues, or reports of acts of criminality which bears correlation to the Muslim community- whether through fear of being accused of being racist and/or Islamophobic, or a genuine refusal to align religion with the actions of individuals or groups. In opposition, the ‘rightist’ camp tends to perceive Muslims as incompatible with western values and therefore a threat to internal security; yet both ‘camps’ have directly facilitated the solidification of the Cultural Defence through feeding into the existing psyche of Muslim consciousness.

 

The 2014 Trojan Horse scandal is a prolific example of the Muslim Cultural Defence, in which the Birmingham city council conducted an investigation concluding that:

‘the evidence shows individuals have been seeking to promote and encourage Islamic principles in the schools with which they are involved, by seeking to introduce Islamic collective worship or raising objections to elements of the school curriculum that are viewed as anti-Islamic’ (Huffington Post, 2014).

 

In addition to this statement, former Metropolitan counter-terrorism chief Peter Clarke and the Department of Education concluded that Trojan Horse was a sustained co-ordinated agenda to impose segregationist attitudes and practices of a hard-line, politicised strain of Sunni Islam (Huffington Post, 2014 ).

It is imperative to note the timing and context in which the Trojan Horse-scandal emerged, which plays an instrumental role in the mentality behind the Muslim Cultural Defence. The employment of counter-terrorism experts and rhetoric in the events of Trojan Horse must be analysed within the wider ‘Islam versus western compatibility’ framework where in 200? Chancellor Merkel disregarded European multiculturalism ‘as Muslim immigrants have kept their own languages, religious and cultural habits, thereby creating sub-worlds’ (Cesari 2013: 7). Britain’s Cameron also voiced the dangers to successful integration in his 2011 radicalisation and Islamic extremism speech:

 

The biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks, some of which are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens… In the UK , some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practiced at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values’ (Cabinet Office, 2011).

 

Cameron’s critique of factions of disaffected Muslims comes after the swarm of Islamist attacks on traditional European norms, inevitably creating a paradigm of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ which has been influential in the formation of the Cultural Defence. The 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh the 2005 Jyllands-Posten Muhammed cartoons in Denmark, the 2007 Lars Vilks Muhammad cartoons in Sweden, the latest Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2010, 2012 and 2015 are all illustrative of the necessity to safeguard Islamic honour and ideals over European enshrined freedom of expression, conscience and speech.

 

This rejection of European ideals by a fundamental faction of Muslims is espoused in the 2006 Policy exchange report Living together apart: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism , where ‘there is strong evidence of growing religiosity among young Muslims, with an increasing minority firmly rejecting Western life’ (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, Ja’far 2007:3) of which ‘Forty per cent of Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24 said they would prefer to live under sharia law in Britain, a legal system based on the teachings of the Koran. The figure among over-55s, in contrast, was only 17 per cent’ (Telegraph 2007: 1).

 

Such evidence of clear preference for Islamic cultural beliefs, over the adherence of national and international laws of the host countries in which they reside, leaves sections of Muslim communities torn between the countries in which they live and the western foreign policies towards the Islamic world which they oppose. The Muslim News states there are 13 Muslim Members of Parliament, out of a total of 650 seats in the House of Commons and across a population of 2 million Muslim citizens, thus leading to a sense of political unrepresentation (Nachmani 2010), frustration and sense of powerlessness, most shockingly demonstrated in the speech Michael Adebolajo upon his murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby:

 

We have killed this man today because Muslims are dying daily because of British soldiers…we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone. So what if we want to live by the Sharia in Muslim lands? Why does that mean you must follow us and chase us and call us extremists and kill us? Rather, you are extreme (ITV News, Youtube 2013).

 

This impassioned affiliation with the Western-afflicted grievances on the Islamic Umma (community) is frequently demonstrated through campaigns and protests in solidarity with the Palestinian cause, with reactionary organisations such as the British Muslim Initiative and the support for anti-Israel politicians, crucially influential in the election of West-Bradford Respect party candidate George Galloway. The infamous declaration of Bradford as a ‘no-Israel zone’ upon the 2014 Israeli ambassador’s UK visit resulted in numerous rioting across Tesco chains, following Galloway’s comments:

 

We don’t want any Israeli goods, we don’t want any Israeli services, we don’t want any Israeli academics coming to the university or the college, we don’t even want any Israeli tourists to come to Bradford, even if any of them had thought of doing so (Guardian 2014).

 

Yet whilst the ‘rightist’ camp has solidified the concept of Muslim consciousness and/or this religious Cultural Defence through the posit of Islam’s incompatibility with the West, the ‘leftist’, camp assumes a more apologist approach, raising the banner of Islamophobia through sensitivity in reporting news applicable to Muslim communities; also feeds into the Cultural Defence complex. The revisiting of the Trojan Horse scandal in April 2016, in which the latest inspection report praises how

fundamental British values are promoted highly effectively…innovative project work and initiatives facilitated through these partnerships have enabled pupils to explore in depth such issues as the dangers of radicalisation and extremism, the impact of the Holocaust and anti-semitism, and equal opportunities, including those related to sexuality and gender (Guardian 2016).

 

It is interesting to note the stress made upon Muslim pupils engaging with Semitism, homosexual and equal sex opportunities, topics traditionally disregarded or disrespected when assuming a literal translation of Islam; an emphatic ideological break with the radical history of the same school in 2014. Furthermore, on the issue of sexual gang grooming, The Jay report into the failings of Rotherham states:

“By far the majority of perpetrators were described as Asian by victims, yet throughout the entire period, councillors did not engage directly with the Pakistani-heritage community to discuss how best they could jointly address the issue… the 27 court cases that we found led to the convictions of 92 men. Some 79 (87%) were reported as being of South Asian Muslim origin’ (Channel 4: 2014).

 

The overt avoidance of highlighting the specific ethnicity of the general perpetrators -and then perhaps naturally the religious factor -indicates a sensitivity and unwillingness to perhaps be labelled Islamophobic and add further insult to injury to the Pakistani community, which is a recognition of the Muslim Cultural Defence.

 

In conclusion it is important to recognise that both ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ camps have created the very conditions in which Muslim consciousness has become both cemented and resistant to the frequent discussions of the role, contribution, effect and place Islam holds in Britain and wider Europe. This has resulted in an ideological retreat into the very communities that understand and offer a sense of immediate belonging whenever the external extremities of either political ‘camp’ instil a sense of alienation in which comfort can only be found in the Cultural Defence, thereby creating parallel communities and systems of governments within the British community and system.